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Radbruch Redux: The Need for Revisiting
the Conversation between Common and
Civil Law at Root Level at the Example of
International Criminal Justice
MICHAEL BOHLANDER∗
Abstract
International criminal justice is based to a large extent on extrapolations from criminal-law
research on domestic systems. The difﬁcult exercise of arriving at a common denominator is
exacerbated by the systemic dichotomy of the so-called common-law and civil-law models,
which, in turn, have now been joined by a third contender: public international law. Each of
thesehas its ownmethodsof approaching the taskof solving legal problems.Thispaper queries
the inter-model conversation that is happening so far and asks the question as to whether it
is necessary to hold this discussion at a much more fundamental level than it would seem
has been the case so far. It does so at the example of the relationship between German and
English and Welsh law, but its concerns and conclusions merit consideration for the entire
debate between the systems.
Keywords
civil law; common law; international criminal justice; law and linguistics; Radbruch
[The English] have a horror of abstract thought, they feel no need for any philosophy
or systematic ‘world-view’. Nor is this because they are ‘practical’, as they are so fond of
claiming for themselves. One has only to look at their methods of town planning and
water supply, their obstinate clinging to everything that is out of date and a nuisance,
a spelling system that deﬁes analysis, and a system of weights and measures that is
intelligible only to the compilers of arithmetic books, to see how little they care about
mere efﬁciency. But they have a certain power of acting without taking thought.
George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn (1940)
Deutsch sein heißt, eine Sache um ihrer selbst willen zu tun.1
RichardWagner
Monexpe´rienceestquesouvent ledroitcompare´estutilise´pourconﬁrmerunesolution
que l’on avait de´ja` trouve´e.2
Antonio Cassese, in Mireille Delmas-Marty and Antonio Cassese (eds.),
Crimes Internationaux et Juridictions Internationales (2002), 140
∗ Professor of Law, Durham University; Visiting Chair in Criminal Law, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
[michael.bohlander@durham.ac.uk].
1 Translation: Being Germanmeans doing a thing for its own sake.
2 Translation:Myexperience is that comparative law is oftenused to conﬁrma solutiononehadalready found.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International criminal justice is, as far as legal phenomena go, a relatively recent
addition3 to the mechanisms of reaction to crime – which is not a thing that can
be said for the crimes it deals with. The idea of justice in the criminal context
developed differently in different cultures over long periods. What may appear to
be a non-negotiable part of one system can be a non-issue in another. Fostering
understanding between cultures is ﬁrst and foremost a question of language in
a deeper, richer sense. Unless the linguistic and cultural inﬂuence on scientiﬁc
thought and practice is given the necessary attention as a primary determinant of
scientiﬁc or academic dialogue, a gap will remain between different legal cultures,
despite the best intentions of the partners to any comparative dialogue. Nowhere is
this gap of mutual understanding greater than between the so-called common-law
and continental (or civil)-law systems, and to differing degrees at that. The author is
a German judge-turned-academic teaching English, comparative, and international
criminal law at a university in the United Kingdom; this paper is a ﬁrst step in an
investigationand it is basedonhis experienceswith theparticular dialoguebetween
the English variety of common law and theGerman system, but, of course, the topic
needs to be studied on a much wider range, including other major common-law
jurisdictions such as the United States, for example.
German law is one of the continental jurisdictions least understood by English
lawyers, who mostly look to France when comparing continental systems. More
often than not, that comparison will focus on procedural issues rather than on sub-
stantive law principles. Given that the process of harmonization of laws within the
European Union has also taken hold of the criminal law and mutual understand-
ing is becoming ever more important if we are to proceed on the path to mutual
recognition as the new guiding principle of co-operation after the Treaty of Lisbon,
somemight say that it is time that the common-law community was providedwith
adequate tools enabling them to comprehend the continental criminal law beyond
mere policy issues and generalist compilations, and, more to the point, to become
acquainted with their underlying epistemology. Mirjan Damaska has described the
problem famously as follows:
[L]aymendislikebeingboundby technical criteria, not onlybecause theydonot always
understand them, but also because such criteria may dictate results at odds with their
ideas about theappropriate solutionof thecase– ideas likely tobegeneratedby feelings
about substantive justice. If externalpressuresnevertheless imposeadegreeof legalism
on coordinate structures, the kinship of these structures with pragmatic legalism is
far closer than their kinship with logical legalism. This is because the legalist of the
pragmatic persuasion and the layman attached to substantive justice demand close
attention to concrete particulars. To both, le bon Dieu est dans le de´tail. On the other
hand, the regulation that appeals to logical legalists is alien to laymen. It displays
insensitivity to the singularity of human drama, and its capacity to assure principled
3 See on the general problems that that entails for the operation of the courts from the point of view of
establishing an amalgamated procedure recently R. Skilbeck, ‘Frankenstein’s Monster: Creating a New
International Procedure’, (2010) 8 JICJ 451.
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decisionmaking leaves laymenunimpressed. They are likely to preferwarmconfusion
to cool consistency.4
German criminal procedural law, for example, takes rather different approaches
to many of the problems of procedural law from those of the common-law family
of countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia, etc. It also differs markedly from the system that is most often used in
anglophonewriting as a civil-law comparison: the French law.German criminal law
is a code-based and so-called ‘inquisitorial’ – better: ‘judge-led’ – procedural model.
The inﬂuence of academic writing on its development has been far greater than in
the common law, as George Fletcher correctly observed when analysing the task of
constructinga terminology inEnglish (orother languages) thatadequatelydescribes
and represents the generally accepted dominant German model of the tripartite
structure5 of criminal offences: ‘This task has not been easy to do in English, largely
because academics lack the kind of authority that they enjoy in many cultures of
Western Europe and the Far East.’6
To staywith this point – the offence deﬁnition and the related level of conceptual
difference – the English dualist concept, for example, can be summarized in the
notoriousequationmemorizedbyeveryﬁrst-yearlawstudent: ‘Offence= (actusreus+
mens rea) – defences.’ This naturally entails the question of where one subtracts the
defences from and what that means for the offender’s liability, for example, in the
context of secondary participationwhere one partymayhave amens rea defence but
not her accomplice, etc. Is insanity really a question of mens rea or does it belong
to a different category of a personal, subjective, mental-state-related context that
wouldmerit a separate classiﬁcation? In the ensuing sections, these issues shall ﬁrst
be clariﬁed mainly in the example of one major Continental jurisdiction, that of
Germany, followed by a look at the increased complexity of the topic in the arena
of international criminal law. This can, by its very nature, only be a mere snapshot
of the wide panoply of legal systems on the Continent and elsewhere, but it shall
sufﬁce to highlight some salient points in the debate about the common and civil
law, which the international criminal justice community in particular may have
overlooked for too long and which may be in need of addressing at root level in
future research.
It bears mentioning as an aside in this context that is primarily focused on
the Anglo-German dialogue that the traditional focus on the dichotomy between
common and civil law does not even begin to reach the level of systemic difference
thatbothsystemsexhibitvis-a`-vis Islamiclegal thought. IslamicShari’ahisaseparate
category that does not ﬁt easily into the division between common and civil law.
It is often neglected in comparative law research, which is questionable, to say the
least, because it is seen as a divine or divinely inspired source of law, demanding
obedience in all spheres of life by more than one and a half billion people on
this planet. This is notwithstanding the fact that most Islamic states do not apply
4 M. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (1986), 28.
5 SeeM. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (2009), 16.
6 G. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law, Vol. 1 (2007), 145.
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pure Shari’ah in the criminal-law ﬁeld, but rely on codes that may be based to
differing degrees on previous colonial principles and indigenous attitudes, which
may be an indicator that there is actually no state practice within the meaning
of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (on which, more
below). The Shari’ah’s way of arguing and the sources of reasoning as accepted
by legal scholars and the leading (clerical) jurists especially in the criminal law
are somewhat reminiscent of scholastic deductions combined with the doctrine of
precedent, but lackingwhatWael B. Hallaq calls a ‘single umbrella category equal in
scope and taxonomical groupings to the modern notion of criminal or penal law’.7
The absence in traditional Shari’ah of any written criminal law apart from the few
legally relevant verses contained in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Practice likens it
more to the common-law tradition of inductive reasoning. In more recent times,8
many of the Islamic countries would also at some point or another have been under
the inﬂuence of colonial powers and modern state-sponsored9 law often proclaims
the Shari’ah as the supreme law of the land, although not necessarily to its full
extent in the realm of criminal law.10 However, traditional Shari’ah will inevitably
have an inﬂuence on how Islamic governments adapt their criminal justice systems
because traditional Islam strictly speaking does not allow a government to neglect
the divine command or the practice of the Prophet in any area of public life.11
2. SOME EXAMPLES
The differences in legal culture and history can be drastic. A few examples may be
mentioned to clarify this point. The German system, for example, has gone through
a development of serious human-rights abuses from the times of the witch trials to
the Nazi era and the political trials during the GDR regime – an experience that has
left deep scars on the German communal conscience and has strongly inﬂuenced
the way most German lawyers think about procedural safeguards for defendants
and about civil liberties in general.12 TheUnitedKingdom, for example, also has had
dark periods, but not nearly to a comparably severe degree in this respect. Has this
differencehadan impact onhowthe averageEnglishman todayperceives the justice
system of England andWales? Does it show in the way the English, laypersons and
professionals alike, talk about their legal institutions? Is the mode of talking an
7 W. B. Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (2009), 308. There are, of course, many attempts now at
modernizing the Islamic jurisprudence from within Islamic parameters as opposed to secularizing or even
Westernizing it; ibid., 500 ff.
8 On the development of the law in theMiddle East, see C. Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law (2009).
9 Seeon thisphenomenonK. S.Vikor,BetweenGodand the Sultan (2005), 254 ff.whocalls the codiﬁcationefforts
‘Shari’a through Siyasa’, i.e. implementing Shari’ah through state-sponsored codiﬁcation. On the situation
in Pakistan, see T.Wasti, The Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Sharia in Practice (2009).
10 See, e.g., A. Belal, Principles of Egyptian Criminal Law: The General Part (2004/05).
11 See on the underlying problems that this situation creates M. Bohlander and M. M. Hedayati-Kakhki,
‘Criminal Justice under Shari’ah in the 21st Century: An Inter-Cultural View’, (2009) 23 Arab Law Quarterly
417, which also deals with the Shi’a perspective and fromwhich part of the above section is excerpted.
12 An attitude inwhich they are occasionally even outdone by the Spaniards; seeM. Bohlander, ‘CaseComment
on Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, Judgments of 15 March 2005 (Case No. 336/2005) and 13 April 2005
(Case No. 463/2005)’, (2006) 70 Journal of Criminal Law 211.
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expression of a deeper cultural afﬁnity for certain problem-solving models within
the ambit of criminal justice? Maybe the relative ease with which the UK law uses
its ubiquitous CCTV surveillance and legal instruments such as reverse burdens
of proof to the detriment of the defendant, and strict-liability offences, as opposed
to the general and principled condemnation any such approach would receive in
Germany, has to do with that human-rights history. This may appear at ﬁrst blush
to be counterintuitive, because Jeremy Paxman, for example, has used the slogan ‘I
know my rights’ as one of the catchphrases most tellingly deﬁning Englishness,13
yet the emphasis put on different interests may not be shared across Europe: for a
German, it is almost inconceivablehowonecanacquiesce tovideocameras inalmost
every public space14 but become incensed at the idea of having to carry an ID card –
something the Germans have done for many years without the face of Big Brother
loomingonthehorizon.TheGermanshavetraditionallyhadareputationasbeingan
efﬁcient, albeit authority-minded,mechanical,methodical, and subservient, people,
more interested in a smooth and efﬁcient running of the different little wheels and
cogs in the greatmachine that is the body politic than in ideas of natural justice and
individual rights. That this reputation runs afoul of the impressive history ofmoral
and legal philosophy in Germany, tied to names such as Hegel, Kant, or Feuerbach,
and its inﬂuence on legal systems all over the world is another matter.
A second example is that Germany has not used jurors since 1924. There are lay
judges in some courts but no laymen-only courts such as the English magistrates’
courts; however, depending on the case and the numbers required for amajority, lay
judges can outvote the professional judges on issues of fact and law, unlike in the
CrownCourt at appellate level in England.15 The trial procedure is not party-driven,
but judge-led, entailing a drastic difference in the roles of prosecution, defence, and
judge. The position of the defendant herself in practice is fundamentally different
in that she is not merely a quasi-piece of evidence, but a fully equal party: she may
address thecourt,makemotions, andquestionwitnessesdirectly, even if represented
by counsel; she does not give evidence whenmaking a statement, is not required to
incriminate herself in any way, and thus, consequently, cannot perjure herself (the
so-called (in-)famous ‘right to lie’). The prosecution can directly appeal acquittals as
well as too-lenient and too-harsh sentences. There is no rule against the introduction
of hearsay evidence, and so on.
Cases of mistake of fact, as yet another example, are (controversially) called
‘failure-of-proof’ defences in English law: the expression is based on the prosecu-
tion’s failure to prove an essential element of an offence. It becomes immediately
evident that this is a procedure-driven terminology referring to the trial situation.
German doctrine also treats these scenarios as the absence of a necessary element
of an offence, but describes them in material, substantive and dogmatic terms: a
13 J. Paxman, The English: A Portrait of a People (1999), 133.
14 The usual popular reply to this that ‘I’ve got nothing to hide’ is naive in the extreme because it is always
someone else who decides what in a person’s behaviour is worth hiding for them, and therefore worth
discovering for someone else.
15 See M. Bohlander, ‘“Take It fromMe”: The Role of the Judge and Lay Assessors in Deciding Questions of Law
in Appeals to the Crown Court’, (2005) 69 Journal of Criminal Law 442.
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Tatbestandsirrtum is not a defence based on the absence of prosecutorial proof at
trial; it is merely the lack of an essential element related to the person and, more
speciﬁcally, the mental state of the offender as such. I personally had a similar ex-
perience at an international symposium when I was explaining an issue related
to the lack of an offence element and an English colleague of mine in the discus-
sion said that that would be an issue ‘on which the prosecution would not have to
lead any evidence’. The conceptual distinction between an element of an offence
and a defence was succinctly captured at the international level by the Cˇelebic´i Ap-
peals Judgement of 2001, when the judges wrote – clearly employing common-law
procedural epistemology – about the question of whether a defence of diminished
responsibility existed under the ICTY’s law:
As stated earlier, both Landzˇo and the Trial Chamber appear to have assumed the
existence of such a defence in international law by reason of Rule 67(A)(ii).969. That
sub-Rule is in the following terms:
As early as reasonably practicable and in any event prior to the commencement of the
trial:
[. . .] the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to offer:
(a) the defence of alibi; [. . .];
(b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental responsibility;
in which case the notiﬁcation shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses and
any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the special
defence.
The Rule is not happily phrased.
It is a commonmisuse of the word to describe an alibi as a ‘defence’. If a defendant
raises an alibi, he ismerely denying that hewas in a position to commit the crimewith
which he is charged. That is not a defence in its true sense at all. By raising that issue,
the defendant does no more than require the Prosecution to eliminate the reasonable
possibility that the alibi is true.
On the other hand, if the defendant raises the issue of lack of mental capacity, he is
challenging the presumption of sanity by a plea of insanity. That is a defence in the
true sense, in that the defendant bears the onus of establishing it – that, more probably
than not, at the time of the offence he was labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act or, if he did
know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.16
While the result is the same in substance17 – that is, absence ofmens rea or another
offenceelementor thepresenceofadefence–thewayofdescribingthephenomenon
is highly signiﬁcant of the different linguistic and cultural approaches to thinking
about and practising law. George Fletcher is right when he states:
The particular attachment of Anglo-American legal culture to the concept of ‘fairness’
derives from the emphasis in the common law on procedural regularity as a value in
16 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic´, Zdravko Mucic´ (aka ‘Pavo’), Hazim Delic´ and Esad Landzˇo (aka ‘Zenga’), Appeals
Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, paras. 580–582 (emphasis in original).
17 Though not as far as the burden of proof is concerned: German law, for example, does not recognize any
reverse probative burden to the detriment of the defendant at all. That would be seen as a violation of the
presumption of innocence, would run counter to the duty of the court to ascertain the truth under para.
244(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and would ultimately be considered unconstitutional.
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itself, a value worth respecting apart from justice in the individual case. Our notions
of fairness and fair play draw heavily on the analogies from competitive sports and
games, which pervade idiomatic English. . . . Relying on a sporting ethics to design
the contours of criminal trials would strike lawyers from other parts of the world as a
distortion of justice[18]. . . .
This characteristic[19] of common law thinking derives in part from the jury system.
The basic rule guiding the competence of the jury is that lay people should decide
those questions on which reasonable people might differ. If reasonable jurors would
not disagree,[20] then the judge should direct a verdict. Thus reasonableness becomes
the standard for demarcating the realm where the expertise and ofﬁcial power come
to an end.21
This procedure-based approach relating to the judge-and-jurymodel in the epistem-
ology of the conversation about criminal justice, and maybe law in general, is also
reﬂected in the terminology of English appellate courts when they have to address
errors of law by the trial judge, if the judge sat without a jury or made a decision in
which the jury did not play a part. The judge is then often said to have ‘misdirected
himself’, as he would otherwise have been held to have ‘misdirected the jury’ in his
summing-up, for example.22 Similar talk based on the judge-and-jury model can be
found in the language of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Jelisic´ case (see
below). A civil-law court wouldmerely state that the lower courtmisapplied or erred
about the law.
3. LOST IN TRANSLATION? THE CASE OF GERMAN LAW
The simple fact of the matter is that there is, for example, no one work on German
criminal procedure in English available at this time,23 neither for the substantive
analysis of the law nor for the linguistic and methodological background. The
standard work in the latter area was and still is a short monograph in German
by Gustav Radbruch from 1947,24 Der Geist des englischen Rechts. The more recent
and thus up-to-date monographic academic-level literature available in English
on the German procedural system at present exists mainly of more or less brief
overviewsections in three comparative collections25 andacomparative case study.26
The German Federal Ministry of Justice has published the ﬁfth edition (2009) of a
18 G. P. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law, Vol. 1 (2007), 136.
19 i.e., the emphasis on reasonableness as a guiding concept.
20 That does, of course, beg the question as to who decides what a reasonable juror would think. Is it the judge,
when, for example, he makes a decision on a submission of no case to answer, called a ‘motion for acquittal’
on the international level?
21 Fletcher, supra note 18, at 141.
22 See, e.g., only recently, Attorney General’s Reference (No 120 of 2009) & R v. Wright [2010] All ER (D) 93 (Mar);
R v. Castillo [2010] EWCA Crim. 658; R v. Thomas and others, [2010] EWCACrim. 148, para. 50.
23 This author is currentlywriting amonograph on that topic to complement his 2009 book on the substantive
German law, to be published in late 2011.
24 G. Radbruch, Der Geist des englischen Rechts (1947), reprinted in H. Scholler (ed.), Gustav Radbruch, Der Geist
des englischen Rechts und die anglo-amerikanische Jurisprudenz (2006), 44.
25 R. Vogler and B. Huber (eds.), Criminal Procedures in Europe (2008), 269; C. Bradley (ed.), Criminal Procedure: A
Worldwide Study (2007), 243; M. Delmas-Marty and D. Spencer, European Criminal Procedures (2006), 292.
26 F. Floyd and J. Herrmann,One Case, Two Systems: A Comparative View of American and German Criminal Justice
Systems (2005).
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67-page statistical overview by Jo¨rg-Martin Jehle on its website.27 The Canadian law
website of Lareau28 has links to German criminal-law works, which also shows the
fragmentedandoftendatednatureof the literature available in foreign languageson
theGerman system. There are a limited number of articles and essays inUK,US, and
other international journals that contain comparative aspects related to theGerman
criminal law; as can be easily deduced from their relative paucity and the page
numbers and the nature of the above-mentioned works, an in-depth, analytically
coherent,andmonolithicexpositionoftheGermansystemisconspicuouslymissing,
both for the legal as well as for the linguistic–cultural part.
What is needed is an analytical, coherent, and systematic presentation of the
academic methodology and the judicial and legislative policy approaches to the
criminal process in German legal culture, as well as their linguistic and cultural
inﬂuence on academic thought and practice to familiarize the common lawyers
with the academic and judicial methodology and overall policy of German legal
thinking in theﬁeldof criminalprocedural law, aswell aswith thecultural emphasis
on and the shape of procedural general principles and protections, and extract
patterns of talking about law as a cultural phenomenon.29 German criminal law is
heavily doctrine-driven, much more so than is the case under the approach taken,
for example, by English criminal law, or, for that matter, the criminal law of many
common-law systems.While it is true that parliamentary law-making has gained a
lot of ground, especially in recent decades, common-law systems have traditionally
relied on judge-based development on a case-by-case basis. Because their law had to
be tailored for use by laypeople as fact-ﬁnders in the criminal process, be they jurors
or lay magistrates, a high emphasis was put on remaining as close as possible to
what judges like to call ‘common sense’,making the approach akin to that described
by Damaska as that of a pragmatic legalist or layman. The following quote from a
well-known English case on the effects of voluntary intoxication on themens rea of
the accused in so-called basic intent offences, DPP v.Majewski, is a good example of
this attitude:
A number of distinguished academic writers support this contention on the ground
of logic. As I understand it, the argument runs like this. Intention, whether special or
basic (or whatever fancy name you choose to give it), is still intention. If voluntary
intoxication by drink or drugs can, as it admittedly can, negative the special or speciﬁc
intention necessary for the commission of crimes such as murder and theft, how can
you justify in strict logic the view that it cannot negative a basic intention, e g the
intention to commit offences such as assault and unlawful wounding? The answer is
that in strict logic this view cannot be justiﬁed. But this is the view that has been adopted by the
common law of England, which is founded on common sense and experience rather than strict
logic. There is no case in the 19th centurywhen the courts were relaxing the harshness
of the law in relation to the effect of drunkenness on criminal liability in which the
courts everwent so far as to suggest that drunkenness, short of drunkenness producing
27 Available at http://forum.bmj.de/ﬁles/-/960/Criminal%20Justice%20in%20Germany_Auﬂage%205_
englisch.pdf.
28 Available at www.lareau-law.ca/codiﬁcation-Germany.html.
29 Parts of the following section are modiﬁed excerpts frommy Principles of German Criminal Law (2009).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.67
RADBRUCH REDUX 401
insanity, could ever exculpate a man from any offence other than one which required
some special or speciﬁc intent to be proved.30
A similar argument with a view to the importance of procedural rules was made at
the international level by theAustralian judgeDavidHunt,whohadpreviouslybeen
the Chief Judge at Common Law at the Supreme Court of New SouthWales, at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case againstMilan
Milutinovic´31 and others, when he said in relation to the prosecution’s contention
that he no longer had jurisdiction to decide on the request of the accused: ‘The Rules
of Procedure and Evidence were intended to be the servants and not the masters of
the Tribunal’s procedures.’32
In contrast, although German law has widely subscribed to the use of histor-
ical and teleological interpretation, which includes the application of public-policy
arguments like the one used by the court in the Majewski case, such a barefaced
rejection of the appeal of logic would be an alien thought to any German judge, let
alone academic. Despite the fact that the development of German criminal law, too,
has increasingly come under the inﬂuence of judicial reasoning about legal prin-
ciples, there is still a discernible impact of and reliance on academicwriting,mainly
based on the pervasive German legal commentary culture. German academics and
practitioners have over the centuries produced large and intricate commentaries on
the different codiﬁed laws andhandbooks onpractice andprocedure.Only the latter
can be equated with common-law publications such as Archbold or Stone’s Justice
Manual in England. Commentaries, some of themwith several volumes, on speciﬁc
codes written by respected academics, seasoned judges, and practitioners through
many editions do not only digest the development of literature and jurisprudence,
but they also analyse them and criticize the arguments put forward by the writers
and judges and, if they happen to disagreewith them, set out their own view of how
things should be done – something hardly ever found, for example, in the leading
English manual on criminal procedure, Archbold. It is no rarity, either, to ﬁnd a
court changing its long-standing jurisprudence on a certain topic because the logic
30 DPP v.Majewski, (1977) AC 443, repeated in R v. Powell and another; R v. English, (1999) AC 1 (emphasis added).
31 Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovic´ et al., Decision on Application by Dragoljub Ojdanic´ for Disclosure of Ex Parte
Submissions, Case No. II-99-37-I, 8 November 2002, para. 14. He had previously made the same argument in
the case of Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic´ & Mario Cˇerkez, Decision Authorising Appellant’s Briefs to Exceed the
Limit Imposed by the Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions, Case No. IT-95-14/2, 8 August
2001, para. 6, and in Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupresˇkic´ et al., Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Appeal by
Dragan Papic´ against Ruling to Proceed by Deposition, Case No. IT-95-16-A, 15 July 1999, para. 18. He was
right to the extent that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the ICTYwere judge-made in the ﬁrst instance
and ranked below the Statute in the hierarchy of norms. However, in systems in which the rules are not
made by judges, this statement is questionable.
32 Citing as authority in the decisions mentioned above, merely two English civil-law cases from 1897 and
1907:Kendall v. Hamilton, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 504, at 525, 530–1; In theMatter of an Arbitration between Coles and
Ravenshear, [1907] 1 KB 1. In the latter, Sir Richard Henn Collins, the Master of the Rolls, said in the Court of
Appeal (at 4): ‘Although I agree that a Court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure, I think
that the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than
mistress, and the Court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which are after all only intended as
general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to dowhatwill cause injustice in the particular case.’Whether
that translates into a statement as general as Hunt J. may have understood it is open to question.
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behind the arguments of renowned academic writers made in such commentaries
or in journal articles convinces the judges that their previous views were wrong.
The fact that German law is to a large extent based on the more or less strict
application of logic andwell-developedmethods of interpretation is also a function
of the German academics’ (and actually also the judges’) attitude to the judicial
process: they do not see academia as the mere handmaiden of the judges, but as
their guiding light. To their minds, judicial practice should, in principle, follow
abstract reasoning rather than adhere to a casuistic approach that favours justice
in the individual case over systemic coherence to the major and overarching legal
principles across the board.33 The German approach, to use a simplistic description,
is thus deductive in nature, as opposed to the more inductive one of the common
law,34 and it runs counter to the inclination of laymen, whomay be ‘likely to prefer
warm confusion to cool consistency’.35 The function and view of the trial and its
effect on legal reasoning in the sphere of substantive law are markedly different.
This begins with the nature and structure of the German criminal process. German
criminal proceedings are, by their nature, not a contest between parties, but an
objective, judge-led inquiry into thematerial truthof the facts underlying a criminal
charge. Equality of arms is not a principle that would apply to a similar extent
and in the same nature as it does in adversarial systems. From the German point
of view, the prosecution, on the one hand, has no individual rights of fair trial; it
has powers and duties, with the consequence that the prosecution cannot argue a
violation of the right to equality of arms because the system is not adversarial, but
the court itself is under a duty to ﬁnd the truth.36 The defence, on the other hand,
has no duties, only rights, yet itmay suffer if it does not exercise themproperly, as is
the case under the well-known common-law ‘save-it-or-waive-it’ principle relating
to grounds of appeal, which, however, in an intriguing converse development of
transplantation of individual legal cultural facets, appears to ﬁnd more and more
favourwithGerman courts, too, especially in connectionwith section 238 II StPO.37
The defence is seen as being, by deﬁnition, inferior in power and facilities to the
prosecution, so, from a German point of view, equality of arms is a principle that
protects the defence, but not the prosecution. Any idea of changing the law, for
example, by introducing probative burdens of proof on the defence or reading down
the requirements the prosecution has to prove (see, e.g., the recent Sexual Offences
Act 2003 with regard to requiring proof of absence of reasonable belief in consent as
opposed to the honest belief standard (probably) still applicable to all other offences
33 This is another typical area of divergence between common and civil-law systems, as has been shown by
Mirjan Damaska in his seminal work, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the
Legal Process (1986).
34 See also G. Radbruch, Der Geist des englischen Rechts und die anglo-amerikanische Jurisprudenz: Aufsa¨tze heraus-
gegeben und eingefu¨hrt von Heinrich Scholler (2006).
35 Ofcourse, in someareasofGerman law,notably labourandemployment law, large sectionsarealmostwholly
judge-made because the government has for some reason or other not taken up the burden of providing
for proper codiﬁcation. Very often, Parliament will, in its acts, codify a long-standing and proven judicial
tradition and, to that extent, there is, of course, a judicial inﬂuence on codiﬁed law-making, too.
36 StPO= Strafprozessordnung= Code of Criminal Procedure, section 244(2) StPO.
37 See L. Meyer-Goßner, Strafprozessordnung (2010), para. 238, marginal number 22, with references to the case
law.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.67
RADBRUCH REDUX 403
under DPP v. Morgan38) in order to make it easier for the prosecution to bring its
case, would have no equivalent in German doctrine, and indeed would be seen as
constitutionallyquestionable.Difﬁcultiesof theprosecution toprove its casecannot
lead to an abridgment of the defence’s position by interpreting down the threshold
of existing offence requirements, as they can in England.
These examples show that some of the fundamental cultural parameters deﬁn-
ing the criminal process as a whole differ drastically between the German and the
Englishsystems, the latterbeing,afterall, theparentsystemofall common-lawcoun-
tries. As already mentioned above, these cultural differences express themselves in
theway laypeople and professionals talk about the law, and the language in turn in-
ﬂuences the theoretical approaches to academic thinking about andpractising law–
something that was picked up early in the twentieth century by Gustav Radbruch.
4. RADBRUCH RESURRECTED
Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949),39 the eminent German jurist and legal philosopher,
hadthe followingtosay in1947about theEnglishapproachto lawanditsunderlying
methodology inDer Geist des englischen Rechts:40
It is not in the nature of the English mind to violate the facts by reason, it seeks
reason in things, to it reason is in the ‘rerum natura’. This English fact-mindedness
does not cherish founding decisions on the expectation of things to come, it allows
them tomaterialise ﬁrst in order to decide once they have arrived. It trusts neither the
imagination nor the calculation of future events, the real situation is always different
anyway; it rather waits until the situation brings the decision, forces it. It feels no
obligation towards the elegance of the clear contour in order to avoid an unsightly
zigzag course . . . its strength is being able to correct and adapt itself to the new
situation.41
Maitland, the great English legal historian, speaks in the same sense of ‘stumbling
forward in our empirical fashion, blundering into wisdom.[42]
In the same fashion, Macaulay says of the English mode of legislation ‘neglect of the
symmetrical and adept order; never abolition of an anomaly merely because of its
having been an anomaly; no innovation unless a grievance was immediately felt, and
then innovation only insofar as necessary for the removal of that grievance.[43]
38 [1976] AC 182.
39 See for a portrait the online edition of the German paper Die Zeit of 10 November 2009 available at
www.zeit.de/2009/46/A-Radbruch.
40 Translation: ‘The Spirit of English Law’.
41 Radbruch, supra note 24, at 47–8: ‘Englischem Denken liegt es nicht, die Tatsachen mittels der Vernunft zu
vergewaltigen, es sucht die Vernunft in den Dingen, Vernunft ist ih[m] Natur der Sache. Dieser englische
Tatsachensinn liebt es auch nicht, Entschlu¨sse zu gru¨nden auf die Erwartung ku¨nftiger Tatsachen, er la¨sst
die Tatsachen an sich herankommen, um sich erst dann zu entscheiden, wenn sie da sind. Er traut weder der
Phantasie noch der Berechnung ku¨nftiger Situationen, die wirkliche Situation ist ja immer ganz anders; er
wartet vielmehr, bis die Situation selbst die Entscheidung bringt, zur Entscheidung zwingt. Er fu¨hlt sich . . .
nicht verpﬂichtet zur Eleganz der klaren Linie, zur Vermeidung eines unscho¨nen Zickzackkurses . . ., seine
Sta¨rke ist, sich jeweils nach der neuen Lage berichtigen und umstellen zu ko¨nnen’.
42 Ibid., at 48: ‘Maitland, der große englische Rechtshistoriker, spricht in gleichemSinne einmal von stumbling
forward in our empirical fashion, blundering into wisdom’.
43 Ibid., at 48: ‘Ganz entsprechend sagt Macaulay von der englischen Gesetzgebung Vernachla¨ssigung der
symmetrischen und geschickten Anordnung; niemals Beseitigung einer Anomalie bloß um deswillen, weil
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This is why most English lawyers are against codiﬁcations, against the consolidation
of entire areas of law in comprehensive codes, and for a method of ﬁnding law that
createsnew lawonlybasedonan individual case and thenonly for that case and similar
ones.44
Radbruch also points out that even where such codiﬁcations happen, they quickly
becomeovergrownwitha layerof case law like ‘a thatched roofbymoss’ that quickly
pushes the direct applicability of the letter of the law aside.45 As far as the linguistic
approach of English lawwas concerned, Radbruch observed:
Even the English terminologywith respect to the law is original and singular.While in
the main continental languages the word for ‘Law’ comes from that which is straight
and on the right side, from the right and the just (Recht, droit, diritto), in English it is
deduced from the [positive legal order]: ‘the law’.46
Radbruch’s writing about the spirit of English law provides a starting point but is,
of course, obsolete in some of the observational details because some of the areas
referred to have undergone reform since 1947. However, his main thesis seems to
have lost nothing of its potency. Andre´ Klip has opined:
Englishwouldbe theobvious choice for aEuropean legal language. This is problematic
insofar as the continental (and thus non-English) criminal law holds a wider sway in
Europe as awhole andhasmore commonalities than the anglophone legal systems . . ..
Yet the experiences with English legal terminology in international criminal courts
have shown that given balanced substantive rules, a new and sui generis system can
emergeandﬁnditsownbalance.Therefore it shouldbefeasible forEnglishasacommon
European legal language to shed its national provenance.47
The precondition of ‘balanced substantive rules’ is the real sticking point, as what
is balanced is often determined not by the letter of a law, but by its interpretation
and thus by the methodology applied by the legal scientists, which, in turn, uses
linguistic and epistemological tools.What Radbruch said all those years ago is thus
likely to remain a pertinent comment.
sie eine Anomalie gewesen; keine Neuerung, wenn nicht eine Beschwernis unmittelbar empfunden wurde,
und dann Neuerung nur insoweit, als gerade zur Beseitigung eben dieser Beschwernis notwendig war’.
44 Ibid., at 49: ‘Deshalb sind die meisten englischen Juristen gegen Kodiﬁkationen, gegen die Zusammen-
fassung ganzer Rechtsgebiete in umfassenden Gesetzbu¨chern, und fu¨r eine Rechtsﬁndung, die aus Anlass
des einzelnen Falles und nur fu¨r diesen Fall und seinesgleichen neues Recht schafft’.
45 Ibid., at 49.
46 ‘Originell und insular ist schon der englische Sprachgebrauch in bezug auf das Recht. Wa¨hrend in den
kontinentalen Hauptsprachen das Wort “fu¨r Recht” vom Graden und Rechtsseitigen, vom Richtigen und
Rechten hergenommen ist (Recht, droit, diritto), ist es im Englischen vomGesetze abgeleitet: “the law”’ (59).
47 ‘Strafrecht in der Europa¨ischen Union’, (2005) 117 ZStW 889, at 908: ‘Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die Wahl
fu¨r eine europa¨ische Rechtssprache auf das Englische fallen du¨rfte. Das ist zwar insofern problematisch,
als das kontinentale (und damit nichtenglische) Strafrecht in Europa insgesamt sta¨rker verbreitet ist und
mehr Gemeinsamkeiten hat als die englischsprachigen Strafrechtsordnungen . . . . Aber die Erfahrungen
mit der englischen Rechtssprache in internationalen Strafgerichtsho¨fen zeigen, dass bei ausgewogenen
Sachregelungen durchaus ein neues und eigensta¨ndiges System entstehen und seine Balance ﬁnden wird.
Deswegen sollte es mo¨glich sein, dass sich Englisch als gemeinsame europa¨ische Rechtssprache aus seinem
nationalen Kontext lo¨st.’
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5. A FEW HERETICAL IDEAS
Aswas indicated above, this contribution is amere introduction to the research that
may have to be undertaken to get to the root of the misunderstandings that often
plague the joint practice of civil and common lawyers. Thewell-knowndichotomies
‘adversarial–inquisitorial/judge-led’, ‘inductive–deductive’ may thus be in need of
beingbrokendown further. The following, perhapsprovocative, hypotheses, related
speciﬁcally to the German/English approach in the criminal-law context but to
differing degrees applicable to many Continental and common-law jurisdictions,
are awaiting veriﬁcation or falsiﬁcation:
• The systematic presentationof a foreign legal system in the technical terminology
of the target language of another country invariably involves a linguistic and
cultural-comparative challenge.
• From a German point of view, English legal culture still has a long way to go
before a genuine stage of general coherent codiﬁcation is reached, if that is desired
at all,48 despite the trend of the last 20–30 years of increasing the legislation
density in many areas. An attempt in the 1980s to codify the entire criminal law
failed because of the prevalent traditional attitude ofmany of themost inﬂuential
English lawyers andgovernmentofﬁcials. TheLawCommissionhas recentlybeen
revivifying the attempt at codiﬁcation, but merely in individual bills and not as
an overall Code. The same can be said for the procedural law.
• Legalmethodologyasunderstood inGermany is identical in theworkof the judges
andof academics, as judges aremore thoroughlyacademically trained inacademic
legal science thanmost of their English counterparts. There is thus no dichotomy
between the two in Germany and the amount and depth of academic treatment
of a case by the courts, especially the highest courts, is thus not substantially
different from that applied by academics.
• Thus, German academic and judicial methods are not in any meaningful way
distinct; there is no friction in communication between academia and practice in
Germany. Conversely, ‘legal science’ – the clumsy translation of Rechtswissenschaft
– is frownedupon and belittled inmodernEnglish legal academia as amechanical
andpractice-oriented, applied-researchvarietyof legaldiscourse, presentlyatodds
with the socio-legal and policy-oriented research focus of the majority of English
legal academia, as well as contrary to the piecemeal approach favoured by the
judiciary.
• A change in attitude may be required in England as one of the paragons of the
common-lawworld, and it can only come about by a reassessment of the value of
academicmethodology and its desired inﬂuence onproactive rather than reactive
law-making. Comparative research in the international justice context requires
knowledgeandunderstandingprimarilyof the lawas appliedby thepractitioners,
and only secondarily of the policies and socio-legal context behind it. In the
Anglo-German dialogue, for example, this translates into an increased dedication
48 See on the codiﬁcation efforts and the reluctant response J. Lavery, ‘Codiﬁcation of the Criminal Law: An
Attainable Ideal?’, (2010) 74 Journal of Criminal Law 557.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.67
406 MICHAEL BOHLANDER
of resources by English academics and lawyers to understanding the German
system, not the other way around because that direction on the road of mutual
understanding has been travelled by many German academics for many years,
as exempliﬁed by such institutions as the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law in Freiburg – something that has no equivalent in
England. There are voices in England that call for a more co-ordinated approach,
and the Germanmodel may be a useful catalyst for that process.
6. THE ADDED PROBLEM OF SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Sofar,wehavebeenmovingmainly in theareaofbilateral comparative research.The
problemofmerecomparativedifferencesbecomesmorecomplex in themultilateral
comparison ﬁeld underlying international criminal justice. This has a lot to dowith
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that deals with
what are the sources of international law impacting on that court. That article reads
in its relevant parts:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualiﬁed publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
It isunderstoodthat theseprinciplesapplytothevariousadhoctribunalsaswell, and
in a restrictedmanner to the ICC, namely if a matter is not regulated by the Statute,
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), or Regulations. And, much as with the
ad hocs, the lacunae exist in vital areas of the general principles of substantive and
procedural law. As I have tried to point out in previous research,49 the linguistic and
epistemological cultural debate between common and civil law is now joined by a
third discussant – one that is their progeny to some extent under Article 38(1)(c)
but which by nowhas become an independent adult offspring: public international
law. Public international law, with its extensive reliance, in the sphere of criminal
law, on customary law as the result of state practice accompanied by opinio juris,
takes a wealth of other factors into account that tend to clash with the fair-trial
and minimum-criminalization-driven approaches of both domestic systems: state
49 See M. Bohlander and M. Findlay, ‘The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis for International Criminal Law
Principles’, inTheGlobal Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2002, Vol. I (2003), 3 (from
which some of this section is a modiﬁed excerpt); M. Bohlander, ‘The Inﬂuence of Academic Research on
the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A First Overview’, in
The Global Community: Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2003 (2004), 195; M. Bohlander, ‘The
General Part: Judicial Developments’, in C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law III (2008), 517.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Oct 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.67
RADBRUCH REDUX 407
practice and international comity. Those two are in an innate tension with the
former, not least because the inﬂuence of politics in their remit is, on average,much
more direct than in the more legalistically guided conﬂict between common and
civil law.
Closely linked to this ﬁeld is that of the personnel who are in charge of applying
the law: the judges. It is common knowledge that there are still pockets of serious
translation errors in the dialogue of the systems within the tribunals and courts,
which leads Rupert Skilbeck to note that ‘Lawyers and judges can learn a great deal
from each others’ systems if they do sowith an understanding that itmay takemore
than amoment to fully understand the intricacies that make it function’.50
Research51 has also shown that it would appear that not all of those who make
it to the bench are actually properly qualiﬁed to undertake the task of engaging in
the interpretative endeavour of marrying the different approaches into a coherent
whole.52 This hasmainly to dowith their previous professional activities, which do
not always encompass in-depth familiarity with criminal trials, but also with other
issues, such as their command of languages. These systemic problems are overlaid
by practical and pragmatic inﬂuences, such as, for example, the methodologically
problematic result-driven use of comparative methodology alluded to by Antonio
Cassese in the quote above or themore logistical obstacles addressed by theGerman
former ICTY judge,Wolfgang Schomburg:
Before continuing, I would like to apologize for restricting my following comments
to German law and jurisprudence.Unfortunately, the workload does not allow for in-depth
comparative research. However, the quoted regulations and case law may serve as an
example for many similar systems. Moreover, up until today nobody has successfully
claimed that this approach violates the fundamental rights to be informed and to be
heard.53
As I have tried to explain elsewhere in connection with Judge Schomburg’s candid
admission:
[r]esearch related to the ICTYanda further study for theSierraLeoneSpecialCourt tend
toshowthatthereareseriousproblemsregardingthefoundationsfortheestablishment
of international criminal lawprinciples. The courts appear to take a rather nonchalant
50 R. Skilbeck, ‘Frankenstein’sMonster: Creating aNew International Procedure’, (2010) 8 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 462.
51 See the previous footnote andM. Bohlander, ‘NoCountry forOldMen?Age Limits for Judges at International
Criminal Tribunals’, (2010) 1 Indian Yearbook of International Law and Policy 327; M. Bohlander, ‘Pride and
Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A Pragmatic Proposal for the Recruitment of Judges at the ICC and Other
International Criminal Courts’, (2009)NewCriminal LawReview 529;M. Bohlander, ‘The International Crim-
inal Judiciary: Problems of Judicial Selection, Independence and Ethics’, in M. Bohlander (ed.), International
Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures (2007), 325.
52 Anecdotal and anonymous evidence may be permitted about this author’s encounter with different inter-
national judges ina social context, oneofwhomapparently thought that incivil-lawsystems, theaccusedhas
to prove her innocence and the other stating at a symposium,with undisguised surprise during the course of
a debate about adversarial versus inquisitorial principles, that this had been an epiphany for them because,
until thatmoment, they had thought that ‘adversarial’ simplymeant that the prosecution is the adversary of
the defence. Another otherwise very bright young lawyer who now is a professor at a renowned law school
actually asked in all seriousness whether civil-law systems knew something like the Fifth Amendment.
53 Mikaeli Muhimana v. The Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, 21May 2007, para.
9 of the Dissenting Opinion (emphasis added).
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approach at building a general part of international criminal law. This may to some
extent be caused by the selection, abilities and attitude of the judges. The judicial
methodology often does not stand up to close scrutiny and one may wonder whether
sometimes the judges do not operate in the knowledge that the law is after all what
they say it is. The approach does not always comply with the principles which have
been developing since the LOTUS case. Itmay violate the principle of legality, evenwith
the rather broad ambit this principle has traditionally foundon the international level.
That the legal systems of countries in the Islamic world and Asia rarely ﬁgure in the
Tribunals’ researchadds to theconcern. If one takes the fact seriously that international
customary law is the product of state practice or general principles of law, then one
cannotmerely rely on linguistically easily accessible sources. If the time pressure born
of the completion strategy and staff reductions is an additional exacerbating inhibitor
to the judges doing a proper job, then it is to be deplored, even bearing inmind the fact
that both Tribunals take up about 15% of the related UN budget.54
Agoodexampleofwhat rushed comparative research cando is providedby the Jelisic´
case. Jelisic´ had pleaded guilty to a number of counts of crimes against humanity,
but not to genocide. The Trial Chamber found him not guilty of genocide upon
his motion for an acquittal under Rule 98 bis and decided that matter on the full
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the appeal of the Prosecutor, the
Appeals Chamber reversed this decision. The common-law attitude to Rule 98 bis,
despite protestations to the contrary in the judgement, impacted on the majority’s
evaluation on the issue of whether a court with judges as the only fact-ﬁnders
should apply a reasonable-jury test. The majority view clearly bears the imprint of
the common-law judge-and-jury model, where it is not the conviction of the judge
that counts, but that of the jurors, with the consequence that a judge can therefore
only take a case away from a jury if no reasonable jury could convict on the basis of
the evidence. This divisiondoes not apply in a judge-only scenario55 and the accused
is entitled to be acquitted and released from custody immediately once the judges
have come to the conclusion that the evidence of the prosecution, after hearing
all the prosecution has to offer, is insufﬁcient to convince them of his guilt. One
might legitimately ask the question as to whether the majority would have applied
the same reasoning if, in the absence of a partial guilty plea as the one entered by
Jelisic´, it had been a question of lack of proof that he was present at all at the scene
of the crimes. The argument put forward in the partial dissenting opinion by Judge
Shahabuddeen56 that a full reasonable-doubt standardunderRule98biswouldmean
that a chamber could appear to be biased if it decided that the prosecution case was
54 M. Bohlander, ‘Comment on ICTR, Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana, of 28 April
2005’, in A. Klip and G. Sluiter (eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. XXII
(2009), 516, at 519 (footnotes omitted).
55 See more recently in a similar vein A. T. Cayley and A. Orenstein, ‘Motion for Judgement of Acquittal in the
Ad Hoc and Hybrid Tribunals: What Purpose If Any Does It Serve?’, (2010) JICJ 575.
56 See the dissent, available at www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf, at 49, where he said at
para. 14: ‘In particular, it seems to me that (excepting clear cases of insufﬁciency of evidence, in which the
decision goes in favour of the defence) the danger of deciding a no case issue by attempting to adjudicate on
guilt at themid-trial stage is that, if the no case decisionwent against the accused, he would understandably
feel that the Trial Chamber had made a deﬁnitive ﬁnding of guilt, so that, in his mind, subsequent defence
evidence and submissions would be addressed to a court which had already come to a conclusion as to the
result of the case. It could not be correct to engender such lack of conﬁdence in the judicial process.’
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sufﬁcient fails to understand the difference between the two scenarios. Especially in
an adversarial context such as the one applying at the ICTY, the court will typically
only have heard or seen the prosecution’s evidence, because the defence, apart from
the discovery provisions, is under no general obligation to show its hand before the
end of the prosecution case. The decision to reject amotion and to continue the trial
is thus not based on a contradictory evaluation of all the evidence, butmerely on the
one-sided presentation by the prosecution, fully taking into account that the court
may, of course, change itsmind after hearing the defence evidence. The reverse does,
however, simply not follow. The only judgewho understood this was Judge Pocar in
his dissenting opinion, whichmerits verbatim reproduction:
It should benoted that the conclusion reached by themajority of theAppeals Chamber
is certainly suited to a system in which cases are eventually sent to a jury or to a
trier of fact other than the judge who evaluates the evidence at that stage. In such a
system, if a judge ﬁnds that, while he himself cannot be satisﬁed of the guilt of the
accused, a different trier of fact could come to a conclusion of guilt, he cannot stop
the proceedings. Should he apply a higher standard of evaluation of the evidence, he
would try the facts himself, instead of leaving the task of doing so to the jury.
In this International Tribunal however, there is no jury; the judges are the ﬁnal
arbiters of the evidence. There is no point in leaving open the possibility that another
trier of fact could come to adifferent conclusion if theTrialChamber itself is convinced
of its own assessment of the case. Therefore, if at the close of the prosecution case, the
judges themselves are convinced that the evidence is insufﬁcient, then the Chamber
must acquit. Such an approach is not only consistent with the text of Rule 98bis(B),
which obliges the Chamber to acquit if it ﬁnds that the evidence is insufﬁcient to
sustain a conviction. It also preserves the fundamental rights of the accused, who is
entitled not only to be presumed innocent during the trial, but also not to undergo a
trialwhenhis innocence has already been established. Further, the principle of judicial
economy is also preserved, in that proceedings are not unnecessarily prolonged: for
what is thepoint in continuing theproceedings if the same judgeshavealready reached
the conclusion that they will ultimately adopt at a later stage?57
Judge Pocar was able to see behind the tempting simple solution that commended
itself on the clearly common-law-based phenotype of the motion for acquittal and
proceeded instead to compare the genotypes of the common-law and Continental
understandings of the role of the trier of fact and its impact on the position of the
defendant. The majority of the Appeals Chamber was either not able or unwilling
to do so, despite its protestations to the contrary and despite Judge Shahabuddeen’s
attempt to use the English case-law references about ‘reasonable trier of fact’ –
language used by appellate courts vis-a`-vis magistrates sitting without a jury58 –
to justify the majority approach; it needs stressing that he did not use one single
reference to civil-law sources, but only used common-law references from a very
limited range of jurisdictions. Compare this to the vastly superior research exercise
undergone by the Trial Chamber in Kunaracwith regard to the deﬁnition of rape.59
57 See his dissent, available at www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf, at 71, paras. 5–6.
58 See his dissent, available at www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf, at 49, paras. 2–14.
59 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment of 22 February 2001, paras. 437
ff. available at www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; and see M. Bohlander, ‘Mistaken
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7. CONCLUSION: IS THERE MORE THAN WHINGING?
First things ﬁrst, but not necessarily in that order.
DoctorWho
Common – and maybe hardened public international – lawyers will be likely to
smirk condescendingly or pityingly at best at what theymay see as thewhining and
complaining engaged in above; somewill maybe see it as more than a civil lawyer’s
pitiful attempt at self-catharsis by publication and feel offended, professionally or
personally. Be that as it may, as my former colleague at Durham, Paul Wragg, has
pithily put it, ‘free speech is not valued if only valued speech is free’.60 Whatmust be
avoided at the international level is the impression that everyone is already talking
to everybody in a fully equal and sophisticated comparative conversation. They
may not be doing so. What this paper has tried to do is to impress on the players
in the system, academics and practitioners alike, that we may actually have to start
talking at amuchmore basic level to each other thanwe have thought necessary so
far and move beyond the eternal mantras about and the lip-service to the necessity
of mutual understanding of different legal concepts to actually comparing their
genotypes, and not merely the phenotypes. Only in this manner will we be able
to arrive at a successful amalgam of principles and rules that will recognize the
special needs of complex affairs such as international trials and move beyond the
constantbickeringbetweenproponentsofdifferent legal systemsabout the superior
qualities of their own.As things stand, one is too oftenminded to view the operation
as being conducted under the legal maxim ‘if it walks like a duck and quacks like a
duck . . .’.61
Consent to Sex, Political Correctness and Correct Policy’, (2007) Journal of Criminal Law 412, at 420 ff. for a
summary overview of the arguments.
60 P.Wragg, ‘“Free Speech IsNot Valued If Only Valued Speech Is Free”: Connolly, Consistency and SomeArticle
10 Concerns’, (2009) 15 European Public Law 111.
61 See in a similar vein A. D’Amato, ‘It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!’, (1991) 6 Conn. JIL 1.
